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In the 1970s, various experiments were carried out on 
ordinary people’s reasoning powers suggesting our natural 
ability to reason does not match up to the normative 
standards endorsed in logic and probability theory. The 
two most famous of these have come to be termed the 
selection experiment, and the conjunction experiment (or 
Linda experiment). In the first, Peter Wason asked 
subjects to test a rule for cards with numbers on one side 
and letters on the other, such as ‘If the card has a vowel 
on one side, it has an odd number on the other’ (Wason 
1971). Wason’s basic finding was that very few subjects 
selected the two cards that are necessary to test such a 
rule, suggesting that they do not understand the logic of 
conditionals (that they are false just if the antecedent is 
true and the consequent false). In the second experiment, 
Kahneman and Tversky told subjects a story about a 
woman called Linda, and then gave them a list of 
statements about Linda concerning what kind of occupa-
tion she has and/or what she does in her free time, and 
asked them to rank the statements from most to least 
likely. Nearly all subjects ranked the statement Linda is a 
bank teller and active in the feminist movement as more 
likely than Linda is a bank teller, which contravenes a 
fundamental theorem of statistics to the effect that the 
probability of any single event A can never be lower than 
the probability of both A and some other event B. (Cf. 
Tversky & Kahneman 1983.) 
Both of these experiments suggest that people naturally 
reason in ways which flout normative principles of 
reasoning. However, that this is indeed the case has never 
been accepted by all parties to the debate. A lot of energy 
has been spent over the last thirty years in trying to sort 
out the implications of the findings (and others along the 
same lines): At the most empirical end of the debate, there 
has been effort to ascertain the real nature of the thought 
processes underlying the answers given. At the most 
philosophical level, many have claimed that showing we 
are irrational is a conceptual impossibility; a central figure 
of reference here is Donald Davidson, who argues that 
principles of rationality are constitutive of the mental (cf. 
Davidson 1980, 1984). At a level perhaps intermediate 
between these two, psychologists influenced by evolution-
ary thinking have argued that an ecological understanding 
of the cognitive challenges we face and of the cognitive 
resources at our disposal reveals that human strategies 
are for the most part fast, effective and even correct in 
relation to traditional norms. That we in certain experi-
mental situations fail to reason optimally is no more an 
indictment of the reliability of our reasoning powers than 
visual illusions are of the visual capacity.  
These findings and ideas will be familiar to those who 
have followed the so-called ‘rationality debate’ over the 
past 20-30 years. In this paper, I want to take up a 
particular way of framing the issues that became promi-
nent in the wake of an article by Jonathan L. Cohen 
(Cohen 1981), and which has informed a recent, critically-
acclaimed book by Edward Stein (Stein 1996). In the 
article in question, Cohen introduces the notion of 
cognitive competence, to be understood by analogy with 
our linguistic competence as postulated by Noam 
Chomsky. Linguistic competence embodies the speaker’s 
knowledge of the principles of grammar that characterise 
her language, but her language behaviour – her perform-
ance – may exhibit divergences from this as a result of 
interfering factors in the process whereby the knowledge is 
put to use (cf. Chomsky 1965, ch. 1).1 Utterances of 
ungrammatical sentences etc. are thus known as 
performance errors – the implication being that they do not 
reflect the speaker’s underlying competence.  
Cohen’s central gambit is that the examples of prima 
facie irrational behaviour uncovered in experiments like the 
above can likewise be viewed as performance errors: as 
interference of an underlying body of knowledge fully in 
accord with the correct rules of inference. Moreover, 
argues Cohen, such prima facie irrational behaviour must 
be so viewed, for there is a constitutive link between the 
concrete intuitions of ordinary people and what the correct 
rules of inference are; in particular, normative standards of 
inference are determined in relation to judgements about 
concrete cases through a process of reflective equilibrium 
(RE).2 In a process of RE, one attempts to bring general 
principles into accord with intuitions about particular cases, 
making adjustments on both sides until the principles and 
intuitions harmonise with one another. Cohen sees a 
striking resemblances between this method and that 
standardly used in linguistics to uncover grammatical 
competence, whereby one probes ordinary speakers’ 
intuitions about the grammaticality of sentences, but also 
rejects some if they conflict with well-established gram-
matical principles. On this basis, Cohen argues for the 
impossibility of irrationality as follows: Given that the 
method in linguistics for uncovering an underlying 
grammatical competence is also the method used for 
uncovering the correct rules of rational inference, we 
should see the latter as apt to uncover the nature of an 
underlying reasoning competence (as I shall call it). 
Hence, our reasoning competence will of necessity be 
characterised by the correct rules of inference, and any 
deviations from it viewed as performance errors. 
As Stein points out, there is something rather fishy about 
this argument (Stein op. cit., ch. 2 and p. 139). There 
seems to be a strong disanalogy between Chomsky’s 
understanding of grammar, and reasoning: crudely put, 
whereas the latter is a normative matter, the former is not. 
Rules of inference or reasoning concern first and foremost 
what one ought to do – how one ought to reason; tacitly 
known rules of grammar do not state how one ought to use 
language, but rather are part of the complex psychological 
processes underlying our linguistic ability. Exactly what 
positing unconscious, descriptive rules amounts to is a 
vexed issue in its own right. But even if we accept the 
idea, it would seem a leap of faith to apply the notion of 
competence in linguistics directly to questions about 
reasoning, where normative matters are at stake.  
In light of this, what is striking about Stein’s presentation 
of Cohen – indeed, of his whole book – is that this does 
not lead him to question the idea of rational competence 
that Cohen introduces. Rather, he proceeds to analyse in 
detail the debate between defenders and opponents of 
what he calls ‘the rationality thesis’ – the claim that 
                                                     
1 For present purposes, I am not committed to the principles being known, in 
the everyday sense. For discussion of the speaker-grammar relationship, cf. 
Knowles (2000). 
2 The idea has its origins in Goodman (1965, pp. 63-4). The term ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ stems from Rawls' work on ethics 
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humans are fundamentally rational – precisely in terms of 
whether our underlying competence is ‘rational’ or not, i.e. 
embodies principles that match up to the normatively 
correct ones. 
It is this supposition – that the rationality debate can or 
should be posed in relation to the idea of reasoning 
competence – that I will question here. In the rest of this 
short paper (essentially work in progress), I will sketch my 
two main lines of scepticism towards the notion, hoping 
they can serve as a springboard to discussion and 
reflection. 
Line I: The first problem with the idea of reasoning 
competence stems from the fact that Cohen’s analogy with 
linguistics does not forge the constitutive link between 
ordinary people’s judgements and what is rational that he 
seeks to vindicate. Cohen seems to want, like those 
influenced by Davidson, to cast aspersions on the very 
idea of an experimental demonstration of human irrational-
ity. Davidsoneans do this by stressing what they see as 
constitutive links between the concept of belief and that of 
rationality; attributing beliefs to someone commits one to 
seeing them as fundamentally rational – or rather, since of 
course people do commit fallacies occasionally, what we 
cannot make sense of is them doing this generally. Thus, 
the constitutive link between rational norms and attributa-
bility of belief applies, not first and foremost at the level of 
particular utterances or actions, but rather at the level of a 
person’s behaviour as a whole.  
Having made this concession, one might think that 
deviations from rational norms observed in behaviour 
could be classed as performance errors, and that the 
Davidsonean argument could be seen as applying at the 
level of reasoning competence, to the effect that this 
competence must contain the normatively correct 
principles. This is how Stein interprets the Davidsonean 
argument (op. cit., ch. 4) – even though he goes on to 
reject it as a defence of the rationality thesis (since, for 
him, there are no strongly apriori constraints on actually 
possessing beliefs). However, it strikes me that this must 
be misguided as a way of understanding the Davidsonean 
argument. For Davidson, it is apriori that we find other 
people rational, at least according to our standards. There 
is no conceptual distance or slack between our standards 
– the rational standards, there being no others – and those 
of other people, such that it might be meaningful to say 
that the rational competence of these others actually 
coincides with these standards. What anyone’s rational 
competence is is, by contrast, an empirical question, and 
we cannot know apriori that any such cognitive structure 
does or does not embody any particular principles. It might 
be retorted that Davidson’s argument amounts to saying 
that we must all possess fundamentally the same 
principles in our rational competence. But this is clearly not 
what is meant. Rather, the idea of rationality depends on 
reaching agreement on what is correct; there is something 
essentially public about rationality. As Davidson has often 
stressed, the existence of psychological structures is quite 
irrelevant to his thesis, and cannot be used to express it.  
As far as I understand him, Cohen has something similar 
in mind insofar as he thinks there are apriori limits to what 
science can show, and one of these is demonstrating 
human irrationality. But if so, then surely the notion of a 
reasoning competence must likewise be unsuited to 
expressing his idea, for it is anything but apriori what the 
nature of any such competence is.3 
                                                     
3 A possible way out here would be to simply identify the correct reasoning 
norms with the principles in our reasoning competence. For criticism of this 
idea, cf. Knowles (2003, ch. 5). 
Line II: Whether or not one thinks there are apriori 
bounds to what can be shown scientifically, it seems clear 
that, empirically, we are in some sense less than fully 
optimal in our reasoning, taken across all possible 
contexts. The question now arises as to whether a notion 
of reasoning competence might be of use in articulating a 
debate concerning human rationality at this more empirical 
level. 
In the most recent defences of the rationality thesis, no 
particular play with the idea of reasoning competence 
seems to be made. This is reflected in the arguments of 
many evolutionary psychologists, such as Cosmides, 
Pinker and Gigerenzer, whose plaint is to point out that too 
little attention has been paid to the kinds of tasks that we 
are evolved to solve in assessing questions of human 
rationality. Cosmides’ work (e.g. 1989) promotes the idea 
of conditional reasoning as keyed to the socially vital task 
of cheater-detection: when conditional reasoning concerns 
the detection of a violation of a social contract, we reason 
logically, otherwise not. Gigerenzer has argued that the 
reason humans perform badly in relation to ‘Linda’ kinds of 
tasks is that our cognitive mechanisms for assessing 
chance events have not evolved in environments in which 
it is meaningful to assess probabilities in this way 
(Gigerenzer 1997). We naturally think of probability in 
terms of frequencies, and make estimates of probabilities 
on this basis, for the most part in ways which statistics 
would countenance, and in any case quickly and effec-
tively. This may lead, under the ‘right’ kinds of conditions, 
to faulty probability estimates, in particular those in which 
probability does not have much to do with past observa-
tions (e.g. in roulette). But that this should render us 
irrational seems just as perverse as accusing the visual 
system of faultiness because we are subject to illusions.  
The details underlying these defences of human ration-
ality are complicated and controversial; nor is the only 
possible conclusion that we, after all, are as rational as we 
could be. The point I want to emphasize is simply that 
these debates do not rest on a distinction between 
competence and performance. Take the analogy with the 
visual system: its functionality does not consist in the fact 
that we embody an underlying body of principles that only 
under certain circumstances are properly manifested. 
Rather, the visual system is a mechanism which operates 
in a certain way, serving, for the most part, rapidly to 
deliver veridical information about external surfaces in our 
environment relevant to potential action. In other environ-
ments, unlike those in which it was evolved, the visual 
system will not serve us well. But it will still be essentially 
operating as it should: there will be no meaningful sense in 
which its errors are merely a matter of ‘performance’. 
Something similar would seem to be the case with our 
reasoning abilities, as understood by evolutionary 
psychology: They are evolved in certain contexts for 
certain purposes, and will deliver us useful and reliable 
information in those contexts. Outwith those contexts, their 
functioning may still be triggered, but then we cannot rely 
on them.  
Contrast this with the case of knowledge of grammar. 
Here, it is not the case that someone who fails to parse, 
say, a garden-path sentence is using a capacity in a 
context in which it fails to have application. The problem is 
not with the linguistic ability, in the sense of our compe-
tence, but with the systems that use that knowledge – or, 
perhaps, with the interaction between the two. There is a 
kind of internal dysfunctioning in the overall cognitive 
system – as there is not when we, say, see one line as 
longer in the Müller-Lyer illusion. To put the point some-
what differently: The visionist has nothing to study beyond 
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the output of the visual input-system, be this veridical or 
not; whereas the linguist precisely does want to go further: 
to determine which aspects of the output delivered by the 
linguistic input-system – the parser – are reflective of the 
grammar and which not.4  
I do not mean to suggest that our reasoning capacities 
should be classed as precisely input-systems in the way 
vision is (for one thing, we can learn to overcome the 
limitations of the former). The important point of analogy 
between them, however, is that they are functional 
mechanisms whose operation is felicitous or not depend-
ing on whether the relevant environmental conditions 
obtain. If we are reasoning about ordinary, repeatable 
events exhibiting a pattern over time, our probabilistic 
judgements will probably be close the mark; if we are 
reasoning about situations involving contracts our ability to 
understand if-so-constructions will be largely correct. In 
other, ‘artificial’ contexts, we can expect less optimal 
performance. However, in neither of these cases, nor in 
the general approach to reasoning adopted by most 
psychologists today, would there seem to be scope for 
something further to be determined beyond the output of 
these mechanisms – an underlying competence of known 
principles. 
In this piece, I have sketched my reasons for rejecting 
this construct in discussions of human rationality. On the 
one hand, for those who see a conceptual, apriori barrier 
to demonstrations of human irrationality, questions about 
our psychological make-up, at whatever level of abstrac-
tion, must be irrelevant. On the other hand, for those who 
want to assess our rationality in relation to a more 
ecological conception of our cognitive challenges, the 
relevant psychological structures for evaluation are not 
bodies of knowledge that are more or less imperfectly 
applied in performance. 
                                                     
4 Here I adopt Fodor’s (1983) terminology, though not, importantly, his concep-
tion of the subject matter of linguistics, which for him is precisely an input-
module (and possibly output-module; cf. p. 135, note 29). For why he must be 
wrong about this, see Knowles (2000). 
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